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Eric J. Adams* The Definition of "Accident" in Canadian
Coverage Cases and the Unspoken
"Useful Purpose" Test
This paper argues that courts tacitly weigh risks against rewards when constructing
the meaning of the term "accident." It suggests the phrase "courting the risk"
takes on two distinct meanings. Firstly, at some point, the risks associated with an
activity are said to be so substantial as to suggest an insured expected and, thus,
courted any resulting losses.. Secondly, a party is deemed to court the risk of.
loss if acting solely for the experience of risk, in and of itself, and not for any other
redeeming benefit. The author outlines the evolution of the term "accident" in the
case law and contrasts the expectations approach with instances where courts
show a concern for the utility or redeeming value of an insured's risk-taking. He
argues that judges employ an unarticulated useful purpose test, and considers
whether this test is reconcilable with present principles of insurance law.
L'auteur allgue que les tribunaux evaluent tacitement les risques par rapport
aux gains lorsqu'ils d6finissent le mot" accident -. II avance que I'expression
anglaise " courting the risk" (prise de risque) peut s'interpr~ter de deux faqons.
En premier lieu, 6 un certain point, les risques associ6s , une activite en particulier
sont consid~r~s comme dtantsi 6lev6s qu'il est possible de pr~tendre que I'assur6
pr6voyait, et que, par consequent, il - cherchait les pertes qui en ont r6sult6. En
second lieu, une partie est consid~r~e " courir - le risque de perte " si elle agit
exclusivement pour vivre I'exp6rience, sans aucun autre avantage compensant
le risque. Larticle decrit I'6volution de la signification du mot , accident" dans
la jurisprudence et fait ressortir les differences entre I'approche fondee sur les
attentes raisonnables et les affaires oO les tribunaux se sont pr6occupes de
I'utilit6 ou de la valeur intrins~que de la prise de risque par un assurd. Lauteur
pretend que les juges utilisent une version tacite du crit~re d'utilite. Enfin, il se
demande s'il est possible de concilier un crit6re d'utilit6 et les principes actuels
du droit des assurances.
* LL.B. (Victoria), LL.M. (UBC). Thanks to Bruce MacDougall, Anthony Saunders and Philip
Girard for very helpful comments on earlier drafts.
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Introduction
Performance artist Brock Enright captured public attention in 2002 when
he started a business offering designer kidnappings to New Yorkers. 1 His
clients paid thousands of dollars to be seized from sidewalks, gagged, tied,
and locked away, sometimes for lengthy periods. His service was tailored
to the particular fears and phobias of each client. Times reporter Morgan
Falconer became squeamish and called off his kidnapping. After the
kidnapping, Falconer said Enright transformed into "quite a pussycat....
[It] was just the game, [but] Game or not, it leads you down peculiar
alleys."' While Enright may have cornered a curious market, the appetite
for gratuitous risk extends beyond his client-base. People seek gratuitous
risk all the time, past the security of games, even to their deaths.
This paper is concerned with the class of actors who -take risks
gratuitously, for the thrill of risk itself, and yet who seek to use insurance to
mitigate the consequences of those risks. It seems strange that individuals
take excessive risks with their property or person and yet are risk-averse
enough to insure their pecuniary interests. However, as Titus Livy notes,
"nothing stings more deeply than the loss of money."3
Imagine Enright's service allowed clients in Canada to experience the
possibility of death. During each kidnapping, his client would face an
agreed upon and randomized probability of being killed. If a death resulted,
however, the deceased's beneficiaries would be unable to claim against an
1. Matt Wells, "Kidnapping for Kicks in New York" BBC News World Edition (I August 2002),
online: BBC <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2163666.stm>.
2. Morgan Falconer, "Kidnapped in the name of art" Times Online (14 September 2005), online:
Times Online <http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts-and-entertainmentarticle565980
.ece>.
3. Titus Livy, "Nec quicquam acrius quam pecuniae damnum stimulat" Annales (XXX, 44).
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accidental death policy in this country. The risks would have been too
great and the rewards would have been too trivial for the consequences to
be deemed accidental. This is because Canadian courts tacitly weigh risks
against rewards when constructing the meaning of the term "accident."
Canadian courts have adopted legal standards that measure risk--or,
alternatively, an insured's perceptions of risk. They do not measure reward.
Nevertheless, an insured who takes trivial, purposeless, or foolhardy risks
faces an uphill battle in making out her claim.
The interpretation by the courts of coverage under accidental loss
policies is broader than it was fifty years ago.4 Nonetheless, this paper
argues that this approach is constrained by a concern in the case law for
the nature and character of an insured's risk-taking. Where risks are taken
superfluously or with no apparent redeeming value, courts are more likely
to -deny coverage. Where an insured can point to some redeeming benefit
in the risk, coverage is less likely to be denied. Thus the phrase "courting
the risk"5 takes on two distinct meanings. Firstly, at some point, the risks
associated with an activity are said to be so substantial as to suggest that
an insured expected the resulting losses. Such losses are deemed to have
been courted. Secondly, risks taken solely for the experience of risk, in and
of itself, and not for any other redeeming benefit are also deemed to have
been courted. Thus, policyholders who act for the mere "psychological
gratification in living on the edge... or in order to impress others with
their bravado"6 are said to havecourted their losses.
This paper is in three parts. Part I outlines the expectations test and
its evolution in the case law. It considers the interpretation of the term
"accident" in liability, property, and accidental death cases as they tend
to borrow definitions from and inform each other.7 Part II contrasts
the expectations approach to the approach in-the case law where courts
consider the utility of an insured's risk-taking. The paper argues that
judges employ a generally unarticulated useful purpose test. Finally, Part
III considers whether a useful purpose test is reconcilable with extant
legal doctrine.
4. Barbara Billingsley, General Principles of Canadian Insurance Law (Markham, ON: LexisNexis,
2008) at 152.
5. The decision Candler v. London & Lancashire Guarantee & Accident Co. of Canada (1963),
40 D.L.R. (2d) 408 (Ont. H.C.) at 421 [Candler] is often quoted as authority for the proposition that
where an insured "courts the risk" of loss, the policy will not pay.
6. Martin v. American International Life Assurance Co., 2003 SCC 16 at para. 25 [Martin].
7. See e.g. B.C. Master Blasters Inc. v. Aviva Insurance Co. of Canada, 2006 BCSC 1488 at para.
23 [B.C. Master Blasters].
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I. The expectations approach
1. The subjective standard
In 2003, in Martin v. American International Assurance Life Co.,8 the
Supreme Court of Canada established the legal test to be used to distinguish
accidental losses from losses attributable to the conduct of an insured. The
case involved a claim under an accidental death provision in a life insurance
policy. The claimant was a family physician who became addicted to
morphine and Demerol after an orthopaedic injury. The insured was on a
physician-monitored gradual withdrawal program at the time of his death.
He died of a self-administered intravenous overdose of Demerol.
The Court held that whether a death is the result of accidental
means is to be determined by assessing the subjective expectations of
the insured.9 If death came unexpectedly, coverage is upheld. If death
was expected, coverage is denied.' In many situations, courts will not
have direct evidence of an insured's expectations, particularly where
there is little evidence surrounding an insured's death. In those cases,
a subjective-objective assessment is required." Courts will ask whether
a reasonable person in the position of the insured and with the insured's
particular attributes and understandings would have expected the loss.
Thus in Martin, the Supreme Court held that the insured's professional
background and experience with the drug, his optimism about his future,
and the compromising state in which he was found, indicated the insured
had not expected to die. Therefore, coverage was upheld.
It is noteworthy that in Martin, the trial judge found the insured
had deliberately engaged in an activity that posed a high risk of death. 2
8. Martin, supra note 6.
9. Ibid. at para. 2 1.
10. See infra, note 35 and accompanying text, for further discussion on this point.
11. Ibid. The two-step approach reflects that set out in the seminal United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit decision in Wickman v. Northwestern National Insurance Co., 908 F.2d 1077 (P
Cir. 1990).
12. The Supreme Court of Canada does not expressly reject this factual finding. On the other hand,
in discussing the trial judge's failure to consider evidence suggesting that the insured had not expected
to die, the Court suggests that some of the evidence supports the conclusion that the insured had not
even turned his mind to the possibility of death, Martin, supra note 6 at para. 37:
The first set of facts concerns the circumstances in which Dr. Easingwood's body was
found. The body was found in a dishevelled state inappropriate for someone who
anticipates death as a potential result of his actions. He was lying prone in his office with
his glasses broken on the floor beside him, with his jeans partially pulled down, revealing
the site where he had injected the Demerol. These facts point strongly to the conclusion
that Dr. Easingwood did not expect to die; indeed they suggest that he did not so much as
turn his mind to the possibility that death would result from his actions [emphasis added].
At any rate, the Court held, as discussed above, that having foresight of the possibility of death is too
low a test for accident and does not determine the issue.
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However, this finding did not determine the issue. The Court confirmed
that an occurrence can be deemed "accidental" even if the insured acted
with foresight of the possibility of loss:
The trial judge found at para. 11, that Dr. Easingwood was engaging in
a "particularly hazardous" activity. Given this high risk, death "would
not reasonably be viewed as an unlikely result" (para. 14). This set the
legal threshold too low. As this Court affirmed in Stats, supra, death as
a result of even highly dangerous activities may be accidental. The issue
is not whether the activity was dangerous, or even whether death was
likely, but whether the insured expected or intended to die. While the
trial judge said the death could not be viewed as an unexpected event,
he equated this with objective likelihood, not with whether the insured
expected to die.'3
An insured's deliberate participation in a particularly hazardous activity,
or foresight of the possibility of loss, is not enough to show that he or she
expected the loss. On the other hand, it is possible to expect something
without intending it. In Martin, the insurer conceded in an agreed statement
of facts that the insured had not intended to die. 4 The Court held that an
insurer cannot validly deny coverage simply because the insured acted
with foresight of the possibility of loss. Yet, in some circumstances
coverage can be denied without proof that the insured actually intended
to bring about a loss:
The authorities clearly stipulate that the mere fact that someone has
engaged in a dangerous or risky activity does not rule out the possibility
that death was accidental, absenting special exclusion clauses in the
insurance policy (Candler, supra at p. 421; Canadian Indemnity, supra,
at pp. 316-17). However, the decision to "court the risk" of death, as
Spence J. phrased it in Stats, supra, at p. 1162, becomes at some point
equivalent to an intention to die.'5
The Court does not explain what, in addition to foresight, is required to
establish an insured's expectations. The decision simply suggests that
in "this small but difficult class of cases, trial courts must work out
the results as best they can."' 6 Presumably, at some point, the risks of
13. Martin, supra note 6 at para. 34.
14. Ibid. at para. 33.
15. Ibid. at para. 23.
16. Ibid. at para. 24.
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foreseeable losses become so considerable that they allow the inference of
an expectation to die. Where this occurs is unclear. 7
2. The objective standard
The expectations test has come to widely define the term "accident" in
insurance policies and has applicability to both first-party and third-party
policies. 8 The decision in Martin, however, represents an extension of
doctrine, rather than a marked departure. While the legal rule has evolved
from a more restrictive objective standard to the more liberal subjective
standard employed in Martin, the jurisprudence has generally drawn
its definitions of accident from an assessment of the expectations and
intentions of the insured or from those of a reasonable person in the place
of an insured. In the 1903 House of Lords decision in Fenton v. J. Thorley
& Co., Lord Lindley stated, "[t]he word 'accident' is not a technical
legal term with a clearly defined meaning. Speaking generally, but with
reference to legal liabilities, an accident means any unintended occurrence
which produces hurt or loss."' 9 The objective statement of this rule is
offered in Halsbury ' Laws of England:
The idea of something haphazard is not, however, necessarily inherent
in the word; it covers any unlooked for mishap or an untoward event
which is not expected or designed, or any unexpected personal injury
resulting from any unlooked for mishap or occurrence. The fest of
what is unexpected is whether the ordinary reasonable man would not
have expected the occurrence, it being irrelevant that a person with
expert knowledge, for example of medicine, would have regarded it as
inevitable.2 0
The objective test outlined in Halsbury's was adopted by a number of
courts prior to the decision in Martin."' This test is more restrictive. An
insured holding an honest, though unreasonable, belief that his or her
conduct would not cause a loss is denied coverage under the objective
17. The same observation has been made of American case law on the definition of the term
"accident." See e.g. Peter John Daue, "The Foolish Insured and Double Indemnity" (1963) 20 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 143 at 147.
18. See e.g. B. C. Master Blasters, supra note 7 at para. 23. James Rendall argues that the equation of
the definitions of accident in third-party cases with those in accidental death claims occured as early
as Stats v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1153 [Stats] cited in James A. Rendall,
"Drink, Drive and Die! Then Ask us to Define Accident" (1978-1979) 9 Man. L.J. 101 at 10-111
[Rendall, "Drink, Drive and Die!"].
19. [1903] A.C. 443 at 453.
20. Halsburys Laws of England, 3"' ed., vol. 22 (London: Butterworths, 1954) at 294 [Halsburyt].
21. See e.g. Johnson v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. (1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 676 (C.A.); Trynor
Construction Co. v. Canadian Surety Co. (1970), I N.S.R. (2d) 599 (S.C.A.D.) [Trynor]; Park Plaza
Cleaners Ltd. v. Saskatchewan Government Insurance (1983), 17 Sask. R. I (Q.B.); Dukoff v. London
Life Insurance Co., [1981] O.J. No. 591 (H.C.J.) at para. 13.
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approach. Today the coverage would be upheld. Yet, the distance between
the objective and subjective tests is not as marked as it might appear at
first blush. Firstly, the distinction is of no importance when a court has
little or no evidence of an insured's state of mind. Secondly, courts in the
past seldom went so far as to suggest that objective foresight or negligence
was sufficient to negate coverage. In Marshall Wells Ltd. v. Winnipeg
Supply & Fuel Co., an insured corporation was denied coverage under a
third party liability policy after losses resulted from the collapse of a water
tank.22 Agents of the corporation knew prior to the loss that the tank was
inadequately supported. The majority of the Manitoba Court of Appeal
found the resulting losses were foreseeable, the insured had voluntarily
assumed a calculated risk, and this risk-taking took the occurrence outside
of the definition of accident. In a dissenting judgment, Justice Freedman
held that negligent conduct can be considered accidental:
That a mishap might have been avoided by the exercise of greater care
and diligence does not automatically take it out of the range of accident.
Expressed another way, "negligence" and "accident" as here used are not
mutually exclusive terms. They may co-exist.23
Justice Freedman's dissenting approach was adopted by the Supreme Court
of Canada in Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Walkem Machinery & Equipment
Ltd.24 While the Court maintained an objective standard for assessing
expectations,25 the Court rejected the notion that evidence of calculated
or negligent risk-taking was sufficient to preclude an event being deemed
accidental. The Court stated:
[On the insurer's argument], the insured would be denied recovery
if the occurrence is the result of a calculated risk or of a dangerous
operation. Such a construction of the word "accident" is contrary to the
very principle of insurance which is to protect against mishaps, risks and
dangers.26
In the decision Stats v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., the Supreme Court
of Canada extended the scope of accident coverage to gross negligence:
Therefore, I am in agreement with Blair J.A. when, in giving reasons,
he said that there was every justification for the learned trial judge's
description of the deceased woman's conduct as dangerous and grossly
22. (1964),49 W.W.R. 664.
23. Ibid. at para. 4.
24. [1976] 1 S.C.R. 309 (WC) [Walkem].
25. Ibid. at para. 19.
26. Ibid. at para. 15.
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negligent but that that was far different from finding that the insured
actually and voluntarily "looked for" or "courted" the risk of the collision
that killed her."
The inclusion of negligence, calculated risk-taking, and gross negligence
within the sphere of activity that can be considered accidental allows
a distinction between reasonable foresight of loss and the reasonable
expectations of loss-a reasonable person can be held to have foreseen
a loss without having expected it. This distinction reduces the seeming
strictness of the reasonableness standard.
Thirdly, the Court in Martin held that an insured can be deemed to have
subjectively expected his or her losses in situations where an insured's
risk-taking is particularly excessive-or where the insured courts the
risk of loss.28 For example, the Court cites the situation in Candler with
approval; coverage was denied to the beneficiaries of an insured who fell to
his death during a stunt performed for his friend on a hotel balcony which
was thirteen floors above ground.29 Martin states, "[o]ne might speculate
that the trial judge [in Candler] concluded that, despite a hope and belief
that he would survive, the insured had knowingly adverted to the risk and
must have, on some level, expected death."3 This, again, closes the gap
between the objective and subjective expectations test. The finding that a
party acting without the intention to cause a loss actually adverted to or
courted the risk of loss (the subjective standard) is not far removed from
the finding that a party's expectation to escape loss was unreasonable (the
objective standard).
II. Chain of causation
A related body of older cases focused on whether a chain of events set in
motion by an insured was broken by an event falling outside of the normal
27. Stats, supra note 18 at 1162.
28. Prior to Martin, Professor James Rendall argued that the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Stats and, more particularly, Walkem seemed to have eliminated the "courting the risk"
category of cases. James A. Rendall, "Annotation," Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hewson, 2003
CarswellSask 191 (Q.13.). With respect, this conclusion seems overstated. The cases do adopt a more
liberal standard. The Court in Stats expressly states that the expectations approach is consistent with
the earlier decisions which applied the courting the risk standard, supra note 18 at paras 20-21. See
E.H. McVitty, "Foreseeability-The Scene of the Accident Revisited" (1979-1980) 10 Man. L.J. 443 at
448-449. Moreover, the Court's statement in Martin, supra note 6 at para. 26 that an insured who does
not desire an outcome could, nevertheless, knowingly avert to the risk and, on some level expect loss,
suggests the old category is alive and well.
29. Supra note 5.
30. Supra note 6 at para. 26.
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course of things.3 The Quebec Superior Court's decision in Claxton v. The
Travellers Insurance Co. of Hartford offers a frequently cited definition:
"Accident" has been defined to be unusual and unexpected result attending
the performance of a usual and necessary act. It is an unexpected event
which happens as by chance, or which does not take place according
to the usual course of things. Any event which takes place without the
foresight or expectation of the person affected by the event; or is an
unusual effect of unknown cause and therefore not expected.31
Couch ' Cyclopedia also states, "[i]n other words, an accident is an
undesigned contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance, something out
of the usual course of things, unusual, fortuitous, not anticipated, and not
natirally to be expected. '33 Some Canadian courts have used the standard
of natural or probable results or the usual course of things to determine
whether or not a voluntary human act was considered the proximate cause
of an insured's loss and, thus, outside of an accidental loss policy. Where
voluntary conduct is succeeded by something out of the ordinary and a loss
results, the interceding element is considered the proximate cause and the
loss as accidental. For example, in Greenway v. Saskatchewan Government
Insurance Office, an insured was involved in a chase with the police and
rolled his car while attempting a high speed turn at an intersection. His
injuries were deemed the natural consequences of his course of conduct,
and nothing fortuitous was said to have intervened between his conduct
and his losses.34
The Supreme Court of Canada has recently clarified the difference
between accidents and diseases in Co-operators Life Insurance Co. v.
Gibbens.35 Gibbens involved a claim on an accident policy of an insured
who contracted a rare and debilitating form of herpes during unprotected
sex and was left paralyzed from the mid-abdomen down. Binnie J., for
31. For example, James Rendall draws a similar distinction in older Canadian cases between those
which equated recklessness with an intention to cause loss and those which analyzed the proximate
cause of the loss. Rendall, "Drink, Drive and Die!", supra note 18 at 104-108.
32. (1917), 36 D.L.R. at 485 [Claxton]. The definition of an accident as an "unusual and unexpected
result attending the performance of a usual and necessary act" traditionally defined what has been
called an accidental results policy. In older cases, courts suggested that an accidental means policy
covers the results following an unusual and unexpected source. As noted above, this distinction was
rejected in Martin, supra note 6. Notably, George James Couch, Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance Law
(Rochester, NY: Lawyers Co-operative, 1959) vol. 5 at 3976 criticizes the application of thefdefinition
in Claxton to accidental means policies.
33. Ibid., vol. 10, s. 41:6.
34. (1967), 59 W.W.R. 673 (Sask. Dist. Ct.). See also, Sloboda v. Continental Casualty Co., [1938]
2 W.W.R. 237 (Alta. S.C. (A.D.)) at para. 9.
35. 2009 SCC 59 [Gibbens].
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the unanimous Court, adopted the following frequently cited distinction
between accident and disease from Welfords Accident Insurance:
The word "accident" involves the idea of something fortuitous and
unexpected, as opposed to something proceeding from natural causes;
and injury caused by accident is to be regarded as the antithesis to bodily
infirmity by disease in the ordinary course of events.36
In Gibbens, Binnie J. notes that disease represents a special subset of
unexpected mishaps:
Traditionally, the courts have carved out of the potential universe of
"unlooked-for mishaps or untoward events which are not expected or
designed" the sub-universe of bodily infirmit[ies] cause by disease in the
ordinary course of events."37
It is noteworthy that Gibbens states the expectations analysis is largely
confined to cases considering an insured's miscalculated but intentional
risk-taking.3" These are called miscalculation cases.39 The decision states
that the accidental and the unexpected are not necessarily one and the
same:
[E]xpectations, while relevant, must be placed in the context of the
other circumstances of the case. Neither the means nor the result should
be viewed in isolation. ... There is no necessary equivalence between
"unexpected" and "accident". If a man, sitting at a bus station, is hit by
a bus that has careened out of control, that is unquestionably an accident
-but it is not an accident by virtue of the fact that the man did not expect
it.
40
These comments could imply that courts should take a two-step approach
to considering whether a mishap is deemed an accident. Firstly, courts
assess the subjective expectations of the insured. Secondly, if a loss is
deemed to have been subjectively unexpected, a court considers whether
it flowed from the ordinary course of events. If the loss came as a result of
an insured's intentional risk-taking, the second step is unnecessary and the
subjective expectations analysis will suffice. If the unexpected loss was
produced by a force other than the insured's intentional risk-taking, the
36. A.W. Baker Welford, Welfords Accident Insurance, 2'1 ed. (London: Butterworth, 1932) at 268
cited in Gibbens, ibid. at paras. 17 and 36.
37. Supra note 35 at para. 29.
38. Ibid. at paras. 42 and 45.
39. Ibid. at para. 42.
40. Ibid. at paras. 44 and 45.
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court must consider whether the loss resulted from a natural, unnatural,
ordinary, or abnormal sequence of events.
This paper considers only the miscalculation line of cases-
namely, those involving an insured's intentional risk-taking. Subjective
expectations, as set out in Martin, likely survives Gibbens as the governing
legal stfndard in this large subset of accident insurance law. Nevertheless,
the Gibbens distinction between accidents and expectations suggests that
courts may be open to arguments based on objective standards.
The differences between a chain of causation or natural and ordinary
course analysis and an expectations analysis are important.4 ' Natural
and probable results employs an ex post and conceptually objective
understanding of causal processes. Expectations assess an individually-
situated understanding of causation from the ex ante perspective of
the insured. In most cases, a natural and probable results analysis will
approximate an expectations analysis. Where an outcome follows as the
natural or probable consequence of an action, the losses will generally be
deemed to have been expected. 42 Where a voluntary act is followedby
events outside the usual course of things, the consequences generally
come unexpectedly. These two approaches are often used interchangeably.
Consider, for example, the language of the decision in MacIsaac v. CNA
Assurance Co.:
In my view it is the unexpectedness of the result that is the essence of
what is meant by the term "accident or accidental" in policies of this sort.
If a result of the type or kind that actually happens could be foreseen as
a natural and probable result of the act engaged in, then the actor can
be said to be courting the risk. What follows then ceases to be accidental
even though it was hoped that a particular result would not follow
[emphasis added].43
In a miscalculation case, there will be some threshold degree of risk after
which a court will deem the insured to have reasonably or subjectively
expected loss as a probable result. All the tests discussed above are
concerned primarily with the probability or likelihood of loss, as assessed,
either upon what would have been expected to occur or upon what
normally occurs in like situations or in everyday life. Expectations or
41. This distinction has been the site of a great deal of debate in legal theory. The move from the
use of natural and probable results standards to foreseeability standards in tort law, generally bears the
influence of the American Realist movement and represents one of their most important and lasting
achievements. Morton Horowitz, "The Doctrine of Objective Causation" in David Kairys ed., The
Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (New York: Pantheon Books; 1982).
42. Crisp Estate v. Great American Indemnity Co., [1961] O.J. No. 170 (C.A.) at para. 6.
43. [1979] N.S.J. No. 573, 32 N.S.R. (2d) 380 (S.C.A.D.) at para. 26 [Maclsaac].
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natural and probable results analyses are not concerned with the returns
or redeeming benefits gained from risk, or with the moral or economic
implications of risk-taking. If the courts, as this paper argues, determine
the scope of coverage by considering the reasonableness of risk-taking (to
be distinguished from the reasonableness of an insured's expectations of
loss) or the efficiency of risk-taking, this determination is not explicit. It
is left unspoken. Nonetheless, the economic or social value of a risk can
dramatically influence the disposition of a case.
III. The useful purpose test
Take the following two examples. Firstly, an individual covered under an
accidental death policy participates in a game of Russian roulette. The
revolver has six chambers. Only one bullet is chambered. The insured
faces a 16.7% chance of death. A referee spins the cylinder and then,
without ascertaining the position of the chambered round in relation to the
firing pin, locks the barrel in place and hands the revolver to the insured.
The insured pulls the trigger and is killed instantly. His beneficiaries
claim against his insurer.
Secondly, an individual with the same coverage makes occasional
trips to the Canadian north. She is required to traverse the Mackenzie
River at Fort Providence, NWT. In the summer, she can cross by ferry.
In the winter,. the river freezes over and automobiles are permitted to
travel over the river on an ice road. On April 13th the insured departs,
expecting the road to be open. When she reaches the river, she finds it
closed. Ferry service does not begin until mid-May. She knows the road
generally closes around mid-April and that the ice has yet to break up.
She can be fined for crossing the closed road, but knows a number of
people who have used it as late as the start of May. It is very late into the
night and the closest motel is two hours south and it charges a mint. She
estimates her odds of making it across at 83.3% and decides to chance
the road. Halfway across, however, she hits a weak patch of ice. The ice
cracks, the insured's truck falls under the ice shelf and the insured dies.
Her beneficiaries claim against her insurer.
In both examples, the insureds face the same likelihood of death.
Neither desires death. They both intend to survive the risk. On a strict
application of an expectations approach, there may be little to distinguish
the two cases. However, the treatment of these examples by the courts
might well differ. The first is clearly excluded under an accidental death
policy. The claim of the insured who dies playing Russian roulette was
considered by the Court of Appeals of Georgia in Thompson v. Prudential
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Insurance Co. ofAmerica,4 and has been cited in many Canadian decisions
as a paradigmatic example of courting the risk of loss.
45
The outcome of the second example is less certain. There are many
instances where courts have upheld accident coverage for policyholders
who participate in dangerous activities. It was considered an accident
where a dentist died as the result of sniffing eth.er from a bathing cap to
relieve stress and depression; 46 an insured died during autoerotic asphyxia;
47
a stuntman died while attempting to dive into a small pool from the ceiling
of the Houston Astrodome; 48 and a hunter shot a member of his party after
negligently firing into the woods believing he had spotted a deer.49 The
risk of loss was present in the mind of the insured in our second example,
but the Supreme Court of Canada is also clear that calculated risks can
still produce accidents. Risk-taking, even negligent, grossly negligent, or
calculated risk-taking, is not a bar in and of itself to coverage.
Arguably, the second example is analogous to the facts of Trynor5 0
In Ttynor, one of the insured's senior drivers was tasked to deliver a
bulldozer resting on a flat bed that was attached to the back of a Mack
tractor, to the company's gravel pit. On route, he came to a bridge. He
stated to a co-employee: "I wonder how strong that is?" After considering
the difficulty of lowering the. tractor to the bank and driving across the
stream bed, he decided to risk crossing the bridge. His testimony at trial
was, as follows:
So I asked him, I said, would you suppose that the bridge is strong enough
to carry us? So he went down, he was gone quite some time, he came
back up, and he said, 'It looks all right.' So we stood there, like he stood
by the cab talking for a couple of minutes, we decided that there was no
sign on the bridge or anything, so that we would try it. So I proceeded to
cross the bridge. That's what happened."
44. 66 S.E.2d 119 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951).
45. See e.g. Candler, supra note 5 at para. 20; Martin, supra note 6 at para. 25; Maclsaac, supra note
43 at para. 23; Booth v. British Columbia Life & Casualty Co., 2003 BCSC 668 at para. 27 (the Court
rejected the claim due to an exclusion for injuries incurred while voluntarily intoxicated. This ruling
was upheld on appeal); Johnson v. Mutual of Omaha Insurqnce Co. [1982] O.J. No. 3543, 39 (2d) O.R.
559 at para. 49 [Johnson]. -
46. Johnson, ibid.; Bertalan Estate v. American Home Assurance Co., 2001 BCCA 131 [Bertalan].
47. C.J.A. v. American Home Assurance Co., 2001 BCCA 132 [C.J.A.].
48. Soucek Estate v. Atlantic.Mutual Life Assurance Co., [1988] O.J. No. 1482 (Dist. Ct.) [Soucek].
49. Bowering v. Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Canada, [1975] N.J. No. 51 (C.A.).
50. Trynor, supra note 21.
51. Ibid. at 604.
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The insured's losses were held to have been accidental and within the
policy, notwithstanding that the driver took a calculated risk by trying to
cross the bridge.
It is difficult to know if the same reasoning would be applied to our
second example. The weight of authority supports a finding of accident.
Thus, the distinction between the first and second examples merits
examination. If courts simply assess an insured's perceptions of the ex
ante probability of loss, it is not clear why the court would uphold coverage
in one case but not the other. If there is a distinction to be made between
the two examples, it does not have anything to do with the perceived
likelihood of death. Rather, a distinction is found in the character of the
risk-taking and the redeeming benefit of the risk. The expectations test
does not accommodate these considerations. These considerations do, on
the other hand, colour the meaning of the phrase "courting the risk." The
phrase is used to refer to conduct that involves a substantial likelihood of
loss.52 This phrase is also used to refer to those who, like the participant in
Russian roulette, engage in risks superfluously, gratuitously, or to simply
experience the risk. 3 While the latter meaning is not reflected in the
expectations test, it exerts a tacit influence on the case law.
There is an obvious and uncontroversial way in which a concern
for the character or purpose of an insured's risk-taking influences the
caselaw. Evidence of purpose can help establish motive. In many cases,
it is disputed whether the insured desired and intended to bring about the
loss in question. For example, circumstances surrounding the death of an
insured under a life or accidental death policy might give rise to suspicions
of suicide. In these circumstances, if the insured engaged in highly risky
conduct with no apparent redeeming value, a court might infer that the
insured actually wanted to die and that the death was a suicide.54 This is
a factual inference.
52. Professor Rendall divides this type of "courting the risk" cases into those in which an insured
voluntarily exposes him or herself to danger and those in which an insured is reckless or wanton with
his or her risk-taking. Rendall, "Drink, Drive and Die!", supra note 18 at 110. With respect, this seems
to be a fine distinction. As this paper argues, the more salient distinction is between instances where an
insured courts the risk by taking a risk with an extremely high probability of loss and where an insured
courts the risk by taking risks purposelessly, gratuitously, or simply for the purpose of risk-seeking.
53. See e.g. Sam Erman, "Word Games: Raising and Resolving the Shortcomings in Accident-
Insurance Doctrine That Autoerotic-Asphyxiation Cases Reveal" (2004-2005) 103 Mich. L. Rev.
2172 at 2184. Erman suggests American courts have not recognized acts of "high-risk bravura" as
accidental.
54. Robert I. Simon, "You Only Die Once-But did you Intend It?: A Psychiatric Assessment of
Suicide Intent in Insurance Litigation" (1989-1990) 25 Tort & Ins. L.J. 650 at 655.
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In many cases, it is clear that the insured did not desire the loss in issue,
but knew that his or her conduct carried the risk of loss. 5 For example, in
Candler it was clear that the insured did not want to die, but wilfully risked
death by prostrating himself along the coping of his balcony.56 In Walkem,
the insured did not want his workmanship to fail. Nevertheless, he was held
to have been aware of the risk of returning the plaintiff's equipment in an
inadequate state of repair. 7 In Trynor, it is obvious the insured's employee
did not want the bridge to collapse. The employee, on the other hand,
ran the risk. 8 In these cases, the coverage issue is whether the insured's
foresight of the perceived probability of loss is deemed "equivalent to the
intention" 19 to cause the loss. This conclusion is considered a factual
inference to be drawn from the circumstances. 60
On the other hand, where it is clear that an insured took a risk without
intending to cause a loss, evidence of the purpose of the insured's risk-
taking does not help establish that the loss was unexpected. The likelihood
of a loss occurring does not decrease simply because a risk is taken with
some purpose in mind. If courts wish to disallow coverage for purposeless
risk-taking, the term "expected" is probably not the most fitting. In its
plain and ordinary use, the term "expectations" refers to the perceptions of
probability or likelihood, rather than defensibility or rationality.6' Taking
risks gratuitously, or without reason does not make them any less probable
or likely. A different test is required. This might be formalized as a useful
purpose test.
American tests for recklessness in tort might serve as models. Prosser
and Keeton on the Law of Torts suggest an actor is reckless where:
55. The Court in Martin, supra note 6 at para. 24 describes this as "a small but difficult class of
cases" in the context of accidental death claims. However, this class makes up the lion's share of third
party liability claims where policyholders are held liable in negligence and, thus, to have foreseen the
possibility of the plaintiff's losses. As Justice Pigeon writes in Walkem, supra note 24 at para. 13:
However, I wish to add that, in construing the word "accident" in this policy, one should
bear in mind that negligence is by far the most frequent source of exceptional liability
which a businessman has to contend with. Therefore, a policy which would not cover
liability due to negligence could not properly be called "comprehensive". But foreseeability
is an essential element of such liability. If calculated risks and dangerous operations are
excluded, what is left but some exceptional causes of liability?
56. Candler, supra note 5.
57. Walkem, supra note 24.
58. Trynor, supra note 21.
59. Martin, supra note 6 at par. 23.
60. Ibid. at para. 32.
61. The American Heritage dictionary, for example, defines "expected" (in the sense used by the
courts) as follows: "a. To look forward to the probable occurrence or appearance of: expecting a
telephone call; b. To consider likely or certain: expect to see them soon; expects rain on Sunday."
"Expected." The American Heritage@ Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. s.v.
"expected," online: Dictionary.com <http://dictionary.classic.reference. com/browse/expected>.
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the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in
disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly
probable that harm would follow, and which thus is usually accompanied
by a conscious indifference to the consequences [emphasis added].62
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines recklessness as:
intentionally fail[ing] to do an act... knowing or having reason to know
of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his
conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but
also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to
make his conduct negligent [emphasis added].63
Both tests include an assessment of the rationality or defensibility of the
actor's risk-taking. A comparable test for insurance purposes might be that
the claim fails if an insured is unable to demonstrate purpose to his or her
risk-taking.
The distinction between the utility derived from simple risk-seeking
behaviour and utility derived from a redeeming purpose may be illusive in
some circumstances. If such a test were formulated doctrinally it arguably
should not mask a moral disapprobation about the nature of an insured's
conduct. 64 However, there may be relatively non-contentious categories
of risks that would be recognized as superfluous or as having no other
purpose than the experience of the risk itself; the case of Russian roulette
is an example.
1. Examples
A concern for utility and motive sometimes insinuates itself into the
language of the legal standards used to delineate the boundaries of the term
"accident." Take for example, the decision Oakes v. Sun Life Assurance
Co. of Canada.65 In Oakes, an insured was killed in a high speed chase
with the police. The trial judge, in reasons delivered orally, found that
the insured courted his loss. As such, coverage was denied. The decision
reads:
62. W. Keeton et. al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5" ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Co., 1984)
at 213.
63. Restatement (Second) of Torts (American Law institute,1965) § 500.
64. Malcolm Clarke suggests that the case law is -often influenced by whether an insured has
participated in morally objectionable or foolhardy conduct. Policies and Perceptions of Insurance:
An Introduction to Insurance Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) at 221-224. See e.g. C.J.A. supra
note 47 at para. 6 (the British Columbia Court of Appeal cautions against importing moral judgment
into tests for coverage). See also Catherine Spain, "Reasonable Expectations in the Sphere of Liberty:
A Theory of Accidental Death Insurance Coverage" (2006) 12 Conn. Ins. L.J. 657 at 663 [Spain,
"Reasonable Expectations"].
65. (1978), 93 D.L.R. (3d) 80 (B.C.S.C.) [Oakes].
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In this case I am convinced that Oakes was "actually and voluntarily
looking for and courting the risk of the collision" that killed him. It
cannot matter, in my opinion, that the risk of being struck from behind
was not as great as the risk of running into a southbound vehicle or of
colliding with a police vehicle upon being forced over to the side of the
highway. Oakes may and probably did expect to outrun his pursuers and
to escape injury, but as in Candler, the collision which caused Oakes'
death was not "an unusual or unexpected incident associated with the
deceased's actions" [citations omitted; emphasis added]. 66
The trial judge distinguishes between expecting and courting death. Oakes
was said to have probably expected to survive and yet was still found to
have been courting the risk of collision. Thus, an insured who does not
expect loss can still be said to have courted loss. It is noteworthy that the
decision nonetheless suggests at the end of the passage that Oakes' death
was not an unexpected incident. The reasons are scant, were delivered
summarily, and are too confused on the issue to form grounds for a legal
distinction between courted and unexpected losses. 67
The distinction between expectations and courting the risk hinted at
in Oakes is more clearly supported if we consider the disposition of cases
on their facts rather than the language in which the legal standards are
formulated. In the frequently cited decision of Candler, the Court was
faced with the claim of a man who placed himself on the balustrade of his
thirteenth floor hotel suite in order to demonstrate his nerve to a friend. 68
The insured lost his balance and fell to his death. His beneficiaries claimed
on an accidental death policy. The trial judge found that the insured courted
the risk of falling and that, notwithstanding that the insured had "hoped
and probably believed that he could accomplish the attempted feat without
injury" that he still had "present in his mind the risk involved. '69 The
lengthy reasons and detailed review of the law do not mention whether the
character or benefit of risk-taking ought to inform the decision. Yet, the
judge's summary of the facts demonstrates a conspicuous concern with
Candler's character and the nature of his risk. Candler is described as
a "very determined, egotistical and reckless individual. '70 The judgment
66. Ibid. at para. 7.
67. James Rendall suggests that this case represents a sighting of the undead concept of courting
the risk. Rendall, "Drink, Drive and Die!", supra note 18. As suggested, the weight of authority
suggests that the expectations test and the courting the risk tests are compatible and complimentary.
The decision in Oakes, supra note 65, demonstrates a conflict between the two. It may be, however,
that the decision simply is not good law.
68. Supra note 5.
69. Ibid. at para. 32.
70. Ibid at para. 6.
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goes into considerable detail about the excessively useless nature of the
risk. It compares this risk to other risky ventures from his life:
However, in most of the incidents referred to in the evidence, there was
something to be accomplished by his unusual acts. In permitting an
adversary to exert a dangerous hold on him in judo exercises he gained
knowledge of the effect of such holds. His feat of climbing the mast
of the boat in stormy weather was to make adjustments to the rigging.
Riding a strange horse bareback over the hurdle was a means of testing
out the horse in the contemplated purchase. Walking out on the catwalk
surrounding the flagpole on the top of the hotel in Cleveland may have
afforded him some thrill from the view of the city that was afforded
thereby. His acts on the night in question in assuming the dangerous
position he did on the top of the coping could have no useful purpose
whatever except the obvious opportunity to convince Simmonds that he
possessed sufficient nerve to accept the challenge that was associated
therewith. His conduct was foolhardy and attended with the most obvious
danger.7
Unlike Candler's other risks, the risk that killed him had no purpose.
There was not something to be accomplished in the insured's risk-taking,
and the claim failed.
The case contrasts with the decision of the Ontario District Court in
Soucek.72 The deceased was insured under a standard accidental death
policy. He was an experienced stuntman with a penchant for dramatic
and death-defying acts. For example, in 1984, he locked himself in a
specially-fitted barrel and was dropped over the Niagara Falls. The next
year, he again placed himself in a specially-fitted barrel, this time in front
of thousands of onlookers at the Houston Astrodome. He was lifted 118
feet to the building's ceiling and was positioned over a small tank of water.
When the rope was released something went wrong. Instead of falling into
the tank, the barrel struck its side, and Soucek suffered fatal injuries.73 His
estate claimed on the accidental death policy. The Court upheld coverage.
It found that the onus was on the insurer to exclude stunts.74 Moreover, the
Court held that, as Soucek had intended to survive the act, his death was
accidental. The decision reads:
Dealing with the facts of the case before me, it is clear that Soucek was a
stuntman and one must assume that his intention was that the descending
barrel would drop into the 12-foot wide tank containing 9 feet of water.
In fact the foot of the barrel struck the side of the tank with great force.
71. Ibid at para. 33.
72. Supra note 48.
73. Ibid. at para. 1.
74. Ibid. at para. 19.
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This, to my mind, was the "accident" and as a result of that Soucek
died.75
The decision cites but does not expressly distinguish Candler. If there
is a distinction to be drawn between the two cases, it is likely not found
in the degree of danger the men faced. The distinction is more readily
explicable by reference to a useful purpose standard. As the court stresses,
Soucek was a "stuntman." He was chiefly employed to flaunt risk in front
of thousands of onlookers. His stunt, like Candler's, was a test of nerve.
However, these tests were Soucek's business and his risk had a redeeming
commercial value.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal considered the meaning of
the term "accident" in relation to high-risk conduct in the decision in
C.JA.76 In C.J.A., the insured died during auto-erotic asphyxiation." The
insured placed a mask and bag over his face in order to reduce the flow
of blood to the brain and heighten the sexual pleasure of masturbating.
The insured was found to have miscalculated the amount of oxygen he
required and died in the act. While the Court acknowledged that "the
deliberate reduction of oxygen to one's brain is an inherently dangerous
activity,"78 it found that "the reasonable ordinary person, not affected by
a moral judgment about the activity, would not see death as its objectively
foreseeable result [emphasis added]."7 9 It seems curious and confusing
that an insured participating in an inherently dangerous activity would
be unable to reasonably foresee the possibility of death. The Court
characterizes the event as a "misjudgment."80 The characterization implies
that the insured was, in fact, cognizant of the risks of death and calculated,
if erroneously, the measures necessary to avoid death. Moreover, the
objective foreseeability standard is inconsistent with the Supreme Court
of Canada's holding that calculated risk-taking and gross negligence often
75. Ibid. at para. 20.
76. Supra note 47. The decision was released concurrently with the decision in Martin, supra note
6 and Bertalan, supra note 46.
77. In the United States, different jurisdictions have decided the claims of beneficiaries to
policyholders who died during autoerotic asphyxiation for double indemnity or accidental death
benefits who died during autoerotic asphyxiation differently. Recovery was allowed in MAMSILife &
Health Insurance Co. v. Callaway, 825 A.2d 995 (2003); Todd v. AIG Life Insurance Co., 47 F.3d 1448
(1995); Connecticut General Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d199 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Kennedy v.
Washington Nat '7 Ins. Co. 136 Wis. 2d 425 (Wis. Ct. App, 1987). It was denied in the decisions Cronin
v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. 189 F. Supp. 2d 29 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Runge v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,
537 F.2d 157 (1976); International Underwriters, Inc v. The Home Ins. Co., 662 F.2d 1084 (4' Cir.
198 1); Sigler v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 506 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
78. C.J.A., supra note 47 at para. 10.
79. Ibid. at para. 6.
80. Ibid at para. 9.
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fall within the definition of the term "accident" in Walkem and Stats. The
objective foreseeability standard is unhelpful.
The decision is less confusing if we consider the Court's assessment
of the insured's intentions. The judgment notes that "the intended result of
autoerotic asphyxiation is sexual pleasure."'" Notably, the Court does not
invoke the insured's intention to survive (though this might be implied).
Rather, it invokes the, insured's purpose of taking the risk-namely, sexual
pleasure.82 It is the purpose that explains the event and distinguishes it from
the useless, foolhardy class of dangers in Candler. The Court's example
is telling:
We are reminded of this regularly by those concerned with the safety
of children who may find old refrigerators or bags made of plastic film
attractive as toys....
But if plastic film a child chose to put to his or her face were not'
removed or the door of the refrigerator in which a child chose to hide
was not opened, I have no doubt all would agree his or her death was
accidental.83
Here, the intention of the child is clear-the refrigerator forms part of a
child's game. This purpose explains the risk-taking. Imagine, on the other
hand, an adult climbs into a refrigerator in order to test her nerve through
oxygen deprivation. The degree of this risk might be comparable to the
risks involved in auto-erotic asphyxiation. The expectations of survival
might be the same. It is the purposelessness of the latter which seems to
render it outside the scope of accidental death coverage.
C.JA. stands in contrast to Davis v. Clarica Life Insurance Co.84 The
insured was a young man known to the people that he roomed with to be
a drug addict. The toxicologist's report indicated a methadone overdose.
His family claimed accidental death benefits. The insurer did not argue
suicide or self-inflicted injury.85 However, at trial the claimants were
unable to provide evidence of the insured's intentions in the moments
surrounding his death. The decision states:
81. Ibid. at para. 6.
82. The judgment in Bertalan, supra note 46 is similar. The Court concludes: "Common experience
would suggest a suicidal intention. But that inference is negatived by the experience, knowledge, and
motive of the insured [emphasis added]," ibid. at para. 6. The insured's voluntary inhalation of nitrous
oxide was explained by the insured's pleasure-seeking and pattern of abuse.
83. C.J.A., supra note 47 at paras. 10-11.
84. 2004 CarswellOnt 9743 [Davis].
85. Ibid. atpara. 15.
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The problem we have here is that as Ms. Kraft has pointed out, nobody
was called who had been with Jamie before his death or at his death. All
we know is that he was found dead and there is some indication that the
people he was living with saw him lying on a mattress at two o'clock
in the morning and phoned the police at eight o'clock in the morning.
Particularly, we do not know anything about what was on his mind in
the day or two before. Whether there was anything that would point to a
wish to die or an intent to die or knowledge that if he took methadone he
might die. Nothing about what he knew of the risks of the drugs. Some
indication from [an] unnamed person spoken to at the scene that said he
was a drug user. Obviously unreliable evidence.86
The trial judge found that the claimants had not discharged their onus
to show that the death was accidental and, thus, within the scope of the
policy; accordingly, the judge dismissed the claim.
It is interesting to consider the onus that was placed on the claimants.87
As the judgment indicates, there was no evidence tendered as to whether the
insured wished to die. Where an insured takes a large and indiscriminate
amount of drugs, an intention to cause self-harm or suicide might be
inferred. 88 Here, the insured evidently took enough methadone to cause
his death. Yet, the insurer did not argue self-harm or suicide. Where there
is no evidence of an insured's subjective expectations, the court is entitled
to consider what the expectations of a reasonable person in the place of an
insured would have been. One might reasonably assume that if a person
does not intend to die from some risk, he or she intends to survive the risk.
This logic was applied, for example, by the British Columbia Court of
Appeal in Bertalan, where the insured died from asphyxiation in the course
of abusing nitrous oxide.89 The Court stated that "[I]n the absence of an
intention to commit suicide, the insured must have either miscalculated
the amount by which he could reduce the oxygen flow to his brain or
inadvertently did not pay sufficient attention to it." 90 What is missing in the
evidence in Davis, however, is evidence of the purpose the insured held in
86. Ibid. at para. 19.
87. The question of onus facing the insured and the insurer is summarized by Osborne A.C.J.O.,
speaking for the Court on this point, in Trafalgar Insurance Co. of Canada v. Imperial Oil Lid., [2001 ]
O.J. No. 4936, 57 O.R. (3d) 425 (C.A.) at para. 18: "The onus is on the insured to establish that, on
a possibility basis, the allegations made by the plaintiff, if proved, bring the claim within the four
comers of the relevant policy. Once that threshold is met, the onus shifts to the insurer to show that
the claim made falls outside the coverage provided by the policy because of an applicable exclusion
clause. If there is an exception to an exclusion, the insured bears the burden of establishing that the
exception applies."
88. Russell S. Buhite & H. Maggie Marrero-Ladik, "Drugs, Alcohol, and Accidental Death
Coverage" (2003-2004) 39 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 985 at 998-999.
89. Supra note 46.
90. Ibid. at para. 6.
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taking his risk. The judgment seems to suggest that it is not sufficient for
a claimant to simply rest on the fact that there was no record of self-harm
or evidence of suicide. The insured must show something more. Without
evidence of a motive or useful purpose behind the risk-taking, the risk
looks entirely inexplicable. Many people use methadone as a painkiller, to
help stabilize the withdrawal symptoms of morphine or heroin, or simply
for pleasure. Its use, however, carries obvious risks. We do not know the
purpose of those risks in this case. The judge rejected the evidence of the
insured's reputation as a drug user. If reliable evidence had been tendered
of the insured's history as a drug user, the result might have been different.
Such evidence could have suggested that the insured had familiarity with
the risk. It would have moreover provided an explanation for his risk-
taking and taken his conduct outside of the category of superfluous or
inexplicable risks.
2. Is a useful purpose test reconcilable with existing law?
If this hypothesis is correct and courts do, in fact, resolve cases with a
concern for the insured's motives and impose an unarticulated onus on
claimants to demonstrate some useful purpose in the insured's risk, we
might question how this concern is reconcilable with the extant principles
of insurance law. Two possibilities emerge. Firstly, a useful purpose test
might be premised on a public policy aimed to discourage policyholders
from engaging in wasteful and useless risk-taking or destructive conduct.
Public policy augments or circumscribes the contractual rights of the
parties to an insurance contract. For example, an insured is not able to
recover losses which result from her criminal activities.9' A policy insuring
for these losses would be void9" because, in the words of Lord Justice
Salmon, "it would shock the- public conscience if a man could use the
courts to enforce a money claim either under a contract or a will by reason
of his having committed such act." 93 Another example is the applicability
of the expectations test to rescuers. Where an insured knowingly puts her
91. See e.g. Sirois v. Saindon [1976] 1 S.C.R. 735 [Sirois]; Oldfield v. Transamerica Life Insurance
Co. of Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 742 at para. 14; Goulet v. Transamerica Life Insurance Co. of Canada,
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 719.
92. In most instances, this prohibition will simply reflect the exclusion for intentionally-caused
losses which is implicitly or explicitly included in the contract. On some occasions, however, an
insured will intend criminal harm, but not intend the scope or the scale of the loss. For example, in
Sirois, ibid., the insured intended to contit the intentional tort of assault when attempting to scare
his neighbour by menacingly raising an operating lawnmower to his face. Yet, the insured did not
intend the mower to slip and severely injure his neighbor's hand. An intentional tortious harm was
intended, but the scale of the loss was not. Theoretically, an insurer and insured could agree to cover
unanticipated losses resulting from intentional criminal harm.
93. Grayv. Barr,[1971]2Q.B. 554at581.
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life in danger in attempting to save another's life, her losses are covered.
The losses are deemed unexpected largely due to the public policy
considerations at play.94
Courts are very cautious about allowing insurers to invoke public
policy as a limit on coverage, especially after a premium has already been
received. 95 Public policy limits on recovery are construed narrowly.96 It
seems doubtful that a court would expressly deny parties the benefit of
their contract sifiply in order to deter wasteful risk-taking. At least one
commentator has recently suggested that goals of deterrence or denunciation
are better addressed by the legislature than through an amorphous public
policy exclusion to recovery on insurance policies.97
Secondly, a useful purpose condition on coverage could be part of the
contract. Two principles of construction are worth considering. Coverage
is construed liberally and exclusions, narrowly.98 The term "accident" is
necessarily broad. Unsurprisingly, the breadth of the term has also made
it a frequent source of litigation, yielding less-than-consistent results. 99
94. The decision reads: "Moreover, because the rescuer's conduct has high redeeming social value,
we can rightly demand less caution in taking on the risk of death than we would demand of the
Russian roulette player. This policy consideration, too, supports recovery." Martin, supra note 6 at
para. 28. Notably, Chief Justice McLachlin's invocation of the public concern complements, rather
than independently justifies her conclusion that rescuers ought not be denied coverage.
95. See e.g. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co.v. Anctil (1897), 28 S.C.R. 103 at para. 14.
96. Standard Life Assurance Co. v. Trudeau (1901), 31 S.C.R. 376.
97. Spain, "Reasonable Expectations", supra note 64 at 673.
98. See the comments of Justice Cory in dissent in Brissette Estate v. Westbury Life Insurance Co.,
[1992] 3 S.C.R, 87 at paras. 47-50. The doctrine is closely related to the contra proferentem rule
suggesting that ambiguity must be constructed in favour of the insured. See e.g. Consolidated Bathurst
Export Ltd. v. Mutual Boiler and Machinery Insurance Co., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 888 at 899 [Bathurst].
Some comments in decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, however, suggest that the two doctrines
are distinct: Lloyds London Non-Marine Underwriters v. Chu, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 400 at 405; Reid
Crowther & Partners Ltd. v. Simcoe & Erie General Insurance Co., [1993]1 S.C.R. 252 [Reid]. This
distinction suggests that construction of coverage broadly and exclusions narrowly applies even where
policy provisions are unambiguous, though their breadth may be uncertain. See Billingsley, supra
note 4 at 141.
99. For a comment on the inconsistency in the construction of the term accident in American law see
Mark D. Ravreby, "'Accident' in the Insurance Context: Some Definitional Problems" (1973-1974)
23 Drake L. Rev. 721 at 744.
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The scope of coverage in an accident policy is often uncertain. 0 The
jurisprudence generally construes the uncertainty in the term "accident" in
favor of the insured.' 0' It may be contrary to a liberal construction of the
term, to read a useful purpose condition into coverage.
On the other hand, the uncertainty of the breadth of the term
"accident"'0 2 might be impliedly limited by the "reasonable expectations
of the parties."'0 3 This doctrine militates against, in the words of Justice
Estey, "a construction which would either enable the insurer to pocket the
premium without risk or the insured to achieve a recovery which could
100. It is not clear that the term "accident" is considered ambiguous in law. Eugene Mooney has
distinguished syntactic ambiguity-or ambiguity arising from the arrangement of the words in a
particular passage-from semantic ambiguity, which arises from an uncertainty as to a general term's
breath. Where courts are concerned with the breadth of the term "accident," this can be described as
an instance of semantic ambiguity. Eugene F. Mooney, "Functional Analysis of Exceptions in Accident
Insurance" [1964] U. Ill. L. Forum 495 at 532-534. Canadian courts have generally not analyzed the
term "accident" as an ambiguous provision. Notably, if the term is ambiguous, a construction against
the insurer-contra proferentem-applies. Attempts by claimants to characterize the term "accident"
as ambiguous, while not expressly rejected, have generally fared poorly. See e.g. Irving Oil Ltd. v.
Institute ofLondon Underwriters, 2000 NBCA 23 at para. 14; But see Sansalone v. Wawanesa Mutual
Insurance Co. (1998), 158 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 65 [Sansalone]. In the latter case, the
Court suggests the doctrine of reasonable expectations applies, at least where a term is ambiguous.
The Court invokes the doctrine to resolve uncertainty as to the breadth of the term "accident." Some
Californian decisions have suggested that the term is ambiguous: Sylla v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 895 (1976); Oil Base, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 271 Cal. App. 2d
378 (1969). Generally, their courts have rejected the notion that the term "accident" is ambiguous.
See James A. Fischer, "The Exclusion from Insurance Coverage of Losses caused by the Intentional
Acts of the Insured: A Policy in Search of Justification" (1991) 14 Workers' Comp. L. Rev. 69 at 82.
101. Gibbens, supra note 35 at para. 23.
102. It is unclear whether the doctrine of reasonable expectations applies in circumstances where the
policy provisions are not deemed ambiguous. See (M.S.) Teitelbaum, "The Reasonable Expectations
Doctrine: Signs and Portents" (2006) 24 Can. J. Ins. L. at 30-32. Courts have applied the doctrine
of reasonable expectations in cases where the decision did not analyze the term "accident" as being
ambiguous: See e.g. Martin, supra note 6 at para. 12; Wang v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., [2004]
O.J. No. 3525 (C.A.) at para. 27; Sansalone, supra note 100 at para. 65. The implication of employing
a reasonable expectations analysis to define the breadth of the term "accident" seems to be, either,
that the term "accident" is ambiguous or that the doctrine of reasonable expectations applies even in
circumstances where policy language is not ambiguous.
103. The formulation of the reasonable expectations doctrine is generally attributed to Professor
Robert Keeton. Robert E. Keeton, "Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions" (1969-
1970) 83 Harv. L. Rev. 961. In Canada, see e.g. Bathurst, supra note 98; Reid, supra note 98 at para.
39. The interpretive doctrine of reasonable expectations should be distinguished from the expectations
test set out in Martin, supra note 6. The term "expectations" as used by the Court in Martin refers to
the foresight of the consequences and expectations of loss from a particular course of conduct. The
term is used as part of an interpretive doctrine to determine whether an insured, at the time of entering
into the insurance agreement, expected certain risks to be covered. Its focus is on the expectations at
the time of contract and regarding coverage, rather than at the time of risk-taking and regarding the
likelihood of loss. It is an open question whether reasonable expectations ought to be extrapolated
from a "typical" insured, or if they should be based upon the reasonable expectations of the individual
insured before the court. See e.g. Jeffery E. Thomas, "An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable
Expectations Doctrine" (1998-1999) 5 Conn. Ins. L.J., 295 at 328-330.
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neither be sensibly sought nor anticipated at the time of the contract.'" °4
While the doctrine of reasonable expectations is invoked more often in
support of recovery, °5 it has also been applied against the insured.° 6 For
example, a court might find the prospective customer who turned his or
her mind to the breadth of coverage afforded under an accident policy
would understand that losses resulting from risk-seeking behaviour are
not borne by the insurer. A court could decide policyholders cannot
reasonably expect coverage for conduct devoid of any purpose other than
the thrill of risk itself. An insured's reasonable expectations might qualify
the otherwise generous construction of uncertainty in his or her favour.
The invocation of reasonable expectations as a limit to an insured's
recovery carries the danger of incorporating policy or value judgments
into the way a contract is interpreted. For example, an insurer might argue
that the use of illegal drugs is contrary to public policy and the insured
ought not to have held a reasonable expectation of coverage for losses
arising from drug use. Eugene Haring writes:
[An insured's reasonable] expectations will be colored by general
knowledge and an appropriate response to the severe problem of drug
abuse. The determination of those expectations will be affected by the
.degree of general knowledge of the problems of drug abuse. Strong legal
guidance from the courts and effective education of the public together
may lead us to appropriate responses to the problem of drug abuse and
accidental death in each individual case. 0 7
In Haring's comment, interpretation and policy are impossible to
distinguish. The contract is interpreted in relation to the general public
policy against drug use, rather than the specific contractual intentions of
the parties.
In Gibbens, Binnie J. writes:
The insurance insider will know, based on the vast repertoire of cases
decided under accident policies, that all of these situations have given
rise at the margins to fierce arguments. The cases necessarily involve
value judgments related to the reasonable expectations of the parties.'°
104. Bathurst, supra note 98 at 901-902.
105. See Billingsley, supra note 4 at 143.
106. See e.g. Gibbens, supra 35 at para. 48; Citadel General Assurance Co. v. Vytlingam, 2007 SCC
46 at para. 4.
107. Eugene Haring, "Drug Abuse and Accidental Death Benefits: Hard Drugs and Hard Cases"
(1972) 8 Forum 43 at 55.
108. Gibbens, supra note 35 at para. 52.
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Respectfully, while it may be hard to divorce the two, the law should
aspire to distinguish between the process for interpreting contracts and
the imposition of public policy limits on the right to contract. 9 The need
for this separation is particularly important in insurance law, where public
policy limits on insurance are interpreted narrowly.
Aside from the public interest in deterring certain types of risks, it
may be possible in many cases to say that policyholders are unable to
reasonably expect insurers to bear the costs of risk-seeking behavior or
gratuitous risk-taking. If this is so, the reasonable expectations doctrine
offers a means to reconcile the unexplained and unarticulated concern for
the character and purpose of an insured's risk-taking with extant legal
doctrine." ° It would help to explain why cases involving similar degrees
of risk, but involving risks with different economic or social value are
treated differently.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that the case law defining the term "accident"
demonstrates a conspicuous concern for redeeming value behind an
insured's risk-taking. Judges seem to employ two meanings of the
phrase "courting the risk." Firstly, judges consider the insured's ex ante
perceptions of the likelihood of loss. Where a risk is seen as being highly
likely to materialize, an insured can be deemed to have courted or expected
subsequent losses. Secondly, where losses materialize as the result of
purposeless risk taking, the resulting losses are, again, deemed courted or
expected. This concern for the redeeming value of risk does not fit with
the subjective expectations of loss test outlined in Martin. Gratuitous risks
are no more likely to materialize than gainful ones. A consideration of the
value of a risk does not further the inquiry into expectations.
I have argued the case law evidences an unarticulated useful purpose
test limiting accident coverage to instances where an insured can
109. James M. Fischer argues that approaching the issue as a matter of public policy rather than
reasonability would be more transparent. He writes: "It would be more accurate if courts and
commentators addressed [the doctrine of reasonable expectations] as a legal 'deux ex machina'
designed to import public policy into private law." James M. Fischer, "The Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations is Indispensable, If We Only Knew What For?" (1998-1999) 5 Conn. Ins. LJ. 151 at
163. While as Fischer notes, ibid. at 164, that reasonableness and policy are often inextricably linked,
it is possible, at least conceptually, to distinguish between a judgment finding it contrary to public
policy that an insured not receive coverage for purposeless risk-taking and one finding that an insured
would not reasonably expect coverage under his or her policy for purposeless risk-taking. At any rate,
incorporating "purpose" considerations into either an assessment of reasonable expectations or public
policy concems would be significantly more transparent.
110. Madeline V. Dvorocsik argues that the concept of "fortuity" should not impliedly exclude
reckless conduct. Madeline V. Dvorocsik, "Maritime LossesResulting from Reckless Conduct: Are
they Fortuitous" (1996-1997) 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1133 at 1157-1159.
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demonstrate some redeeming benefit or purpose. The cases would be
more consistent and transparent if such a test were formalized. This is
reconcilable with extant doctrine. An insurer might argue that a useful
purpose requirement could form an implicit part of accident insurance
contracts. A court is required to construe coverage in accordance with
the reasonable expectations of the parties. It may be unreasonable for a
policyholder to expect to be indemnified under an accident policy for the
consequences of gratuitous risk-taking or risk-seeking behaviour.

